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THE ECONOMICS OF SEWAGE DISPOSAL IN
A COASTAL URBAN AREA-A CASE STUDY
OF THE MONTEREY PENNINSULA, CALIFORNIAt
GAIL ERIC UPDEGRAFFtt

California's coastal zone' contains 90 percent of the state's
population but only 8 percent of the land area.2 Numerous land and
water use conflicts have emerged in the coastal zone as a result of
urbanization. Some of the most classic examples of these conflicts,
and some which have received extensive publicity, are the conflicts
that arise when estuaries and bays are utilized for disposal of
domestic and industrial sewage.
This article presents a case study of the water pollution problem
of the Monterey Peninsula, which lies between Monterey Bay and
Carmel Bay approximately 120 miles south of San Francisco. Monterey and Carmel bays are noted for being two of the most popular
recreational attractions for both California residents and out-of-state
visitors. The area studied is comprised of several communities, both
incorporated and unincorporated, a few military installations, and
has a total population of 162,000. In addition, there is a population
equivalent of 15,000 visitors each year.
I
BACKGROUND

Virtually all of the sewage from the Monterey Peninsula is
domestic and is discharged into the waters of Carmel and Monterey
bays. Four percent is discharged raw, 49 percent receives primary
tThis article is based in part on a doctoral dissertation of the same title being written
under the guidance of S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup and supported by the California Agricultural
Experiment Station. The author appreciates the valuable comments and suggestions of
Professor Wantrup on earlier drafts. Appreciation is also extended to Larry E. Ruff, Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego. The responsibility for errors rests
with the author.
tfPostgraduate Research Agricultural Economist and graduate student, Department of
Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley; Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at Michigan State University.
1. As defined by the California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources
and the Interagency Council on Ocean Resources, the seaward limit of California's coastal
zone is basically the international and U.S. Federal boundary, and the landward limit is a
line that runs about 20 miles back from the coast and generally parallels the shore. Exceptions to these limits are made seaward to include all the channel islands off Southern
California and landward to include Stockton, Sacramento, the areas bordering San Francisco
Bay, and the San Bernardino-Riverside portion of the Southern California Metropolitan
Area.
2. California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources and the Interagency
Council on Ocean Resources, California's Coastal Zone (Sept. 1968).
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treatment (i.e., settling and chlorination), and 47 percent receives
secondary treatment (i.e., primary treatment plus biological treatment).
In April of 1969, a year-long intensive study of the waters adjacent to the Monterey Peninsula was initiated by the California
Department of Public Health in conjunction with the Monterey
County Health Department. This study concentrated on determining
whether or not the waters satisfied the established standard for
coliform bacteria allowable in waters utilized for water contact
sports.' After the first six months of the study, enough evidence was
accumulated to establish that the waters exceeded the state
standard. As a result, 6 miles of beach were closed in September. of
1969 by the Monterey County Health Department. Monitoring of
the waters continued, and when it was evident that the situation was
not improving, the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control
Board (CCRWQCB), which operates in a semi-autonomous manner as
a subdivision of the Regional Water Quality Control Division of the
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), issued an order to
the Monterey Peninsula communities to cease and desist from pollution of Carmel and Monterey bays. This order was followed by a
building ban order by the Board two months later.
In addition to the above study, independent studies were made by
marine and oceanographic research stations in the area. These studies
concentrated on bay and ocean currents and the effect of sewage
effluent on the marine environment. They produced evidence that
currents in Carmel and Monterey bays are not conducive to sewage
3. The state salt water bathing standard (coliform), which was established by the State
Department of Public Health in 1942, is 1000 per 100 milliliters in waters utilized for water
contact sports. The objective of using coliforms (which may be found in warmblooded
animal intestines, soil, on plants and insects, in old sewage, and in waters polluted some time
in the past) as an indicator of the sanitary quality of water is to evaluate the disease-

producing potential of the water. Although not based on epidemiology of swimmers, but
rather upon the number of coliform in the water as representing the amount of sewage
likely to be ingested by a swimmer, the standard was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in a
Los Angeles case as a rational public health standard. People v. City of Los Angeles, 335

U.S. 852 (1948). The decision was based on the fact that a predictable relationship between
coliform density and public health hazard can be established in salt water. There are
basically three reasons for this. First, sea water is ingested by one engaged in water contact

sports in amounts of about one milliliter at a time. Second, coliform survive only a short
time in salt water (3 to 5 days). Third, because of the typical pattern of concentration of
coliform along the shoreline in the vicinity of an ocean sewer outfall, the coliform of sewage
origin can be identified, and have a numerical relationship to the degree of dispersion of the
original sewage and the pathogens it may have contained.
No interpretable relationship between coliform numbers and a public health hazard exists
for fresh waters. There are two reasons for this. First, the dominant source of coliform in
this instance is the wash from agricultural land, particularly fertilized fields. Second, the
coliforms in chlorinated sewage effluent will recover and grow in fresh water, eventually
reaching concentrations as great as unchlorinated sewage.
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disposal. This conclusion was based on the discoveries that there is
very little mixing action and that the effluent is carried to, and may
remain in, the nearshore waters. In addition, biological alteration and
damage (defined as a reduction in the abundancy and variety of
species of marine fauna and flora) has occurred as a result of sewage
disposal. 4
II
ECONOMIC PROBLEM

The problem appears to be that there is not sufficient treatment of
sewage before it is discharged into the ocean. Along this line it is
perhaps interesting, and at least informative, to survey investment in
sewage disposal facilities between 1950 and 1970. Data collected
from sanitation districts and communities in the area demonstrated
that the weighted average for sewage treatment facilities investment
declined from $6.81 per capita annually in 1950 to $5.42 per capita
annually in 1970.'
The question arises whether economies of scale for sewage treatment facilities account for the difference. However, this is doubtful.
Published cost data indicate that economies resulting from increased
service population could account for only as much as one dollar of
the difference. 6 Furthermore, the treatment plants constructed or
expanded around 1950 were at that time of just sufficient capacity
to maintain efficiency under peak loads, but there were three plants
(accounting for 64 percent of the Peninsula sewage load) which experienced flooding and had to by-pass raw sewage during peak loads
for 1969-70. The implication is that the quality of treatment decreased from 1950 to 1970.
Another way of considering Peninsula investment in treatment
facilities is to survey the quality of treatment with regard to the
sewage load exerted on Carmel and Monterey bays. In 1950, the area
serviced by treatment plants or septic tanks discharging into these
waters had a sewage disposal load of 6,000,000 gpd. By early 1970,
the load had increased to 14,000,000 gpd. Furthermore, only one
community had gone to a higher level of treatment during this time.
4. Monterey Peninsula Herald, Oct. 10, 1969, at 5; Monterey Peninsula Herald, June 12,
1970, at 5.
5. All data were adjusted to May, 1970 using the WPC-STP index. The figures given are
weighted to take account of the fact that the per capita sewage volume increased from 80
gallons per day (gpd) in 1950 to 90 gpd in 1970. It was deemed desirable to express figures
as cost per capita rather than cost per 1000 gallons in order to add perspective to the results
and argument presented in later sections.
6. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, Cost of
Conventional and Advanced Treatment of Waste Waters, at 1-3 (1968).
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As measured by standard parameters, the result was a significant
increase in waste loadings imposed on the waters. For example,
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), which serves as a measure of the
sewage effluent's use of dissolved oxygen during decomposition in
the ocean waters, had increased from 9500 pounds per day in 1950
to 19,500 pounds per day in 1970. Dissolved oxygen is also essential
to the sustenance of marine fauna and flora. Other load parameters
such as bacterial contamination, suspended solids, and detergent and
nutrient levels had increased anywhere from 110 to 160 percent
above their 1950 levels.
The above analysis might be thought of as confirming the
hypothesis that capital investment in treatment facilities has not kept
pace with population growth for the Monterey Peninsula. But what
level of investment is needed? It could be argued that the amount of
investment needed is that which would restore waste loadings, as
measured by standard parameters, to their 1950 levels. The standard
economic reasoning, however, is that investment should continue
until the benefits achieved by the last increment in investment are
just equal to the costs of that investment. This reasoning, referred to
as marginal analysis, will be examined in Section IV.
III
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The economic problem of determining investment in treatment
facilities is influenced by certain institutional factors. The first of
these is associated with the fragmented governmental units of the
Monterey Peninsula. There are essentially 6 sanitation districts. The
Monterey County Health Department and CCRWQCB have established water quality standards. But enforcement of these standards is
carried out by monitoring bay and other adjacent waters after discharge and not the quantity and quality of effluent at each treatment
plant or raw sewage outfall before discharge.
Under this arrangement, the discharge of a low quality effluent by
one or more communities in the area requires a higher quality discharge by the remainder of the communities in order for the communities as a whole to satisfy bay water quality standards. That is,
up to a certain volume and strength of sewage effluent discharged, an
individual community may depend upon other communities to
satisfy bay standards by assuming that these communities will treat
their discharges at a relatively higher level or reduce their volume or
both. Hence, in terms of minimizing expenditures for sewage treatment facilities, it is in the best interests of the communities as
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separate entities to maintain low levels of treatment and let the other
communities bear the cost burden of bay water quality standards.
A second institutional factor is evidenced by what took place after
the beaches were closed. The CCRWQCB desired to bring about a
centralized (regional) system of sewage treatment for the Monterey
Peninsula. CCRWQCB asked for cheap intermediate steps until a
regional system was set up. However, the idea of a regional system
was immediately opposed by all but one of the communities and
their consultants. On the other hand, the Association of Monterey
Bay Area Governments (AMBAG), of which the communities are
members, supported the regional system.7
A building moratorium by AMBAG was rescinded 4 months prior
to the opening of the 6 miles of beach by the Monterey County
Health Department. The reason given was that the moratorium had
caused undue economic hardship.8 The building ban imposed by
CCRWQCB was not withdrawn even after the beaches were opened.
In fact, nearly a month after contamination posting was listed,
CCRWQCB filed suit against the individual communities of the
Monterey Peninsula. These suits, filed under The Porter-Cologne
Water Quality Control Act, carried the possibility of a superior court
injunction or the imposition of civil monetary fines of up to $6000 a
day or both.'
A few of the communities, following their initial reaction, had
begun to consider favorably the idea of a regional sewage disposal
system. Nevertheless, whatever the purpose of the suits, they led to
the communities dropping consideration of a regional system and
formulating plans for individual secondary treatment plants. Officials
interviewed said that in view of the state's attitude, they had no
choice but to upgrade present plants as soon as possible.
The above developments indicate that the roles of the community,
region and state in the solution of the water pollution problem are
not clearly defined. The initiative to find a solution came from the
state by way of CCRWQCB. Was this the proper function of the
state, and was it handled in a creative manner? The knowledge that
there was a pollution problem was afforded through a joint effort of
the region and state. The knowledge, although limited to two alternatives, with respect to solutions was provided by the communities
and their consultants. Were these the proper sources? Finally, the
state had the only legal authority to order the communities to stop
polluting and to impose suits if they did not. Was this authority
7. Monterey Peninsula Herald, Dec. 3, 1969, at 1.
8. Monterey Peninsula Herald, Oct. 30, 1969, at 12.
9. Cal. Water Code Ann. § § 13311, 13350 (West 1970).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

properly created and exercised, and was it sufficient? Should
AMBAG or some other regional entity have this or similar authority
in addition to, or instead of, the state? These questions and other
institutional problems that arise in the course of this article will be
taken up in Section VII.
IV
NET BENEFITS ARGUMENT
The level of investment which results from following the rule of
marginal analysis is normally called the optimum or efficient level of
investment. There are some objections to this concept of efficiency.
For instance, which net benefits are to be maximized: a community's, the Monterey Peninsula's, or the state's? That there can be a
divergence between "private" and "social" efficiency is the fundamental cause of water pollution. Furthermore, even if the term
efficiency were unambiguous, efficiency is only one of the criteria
employed in decision making. Equity may be an equally important
criterion in the democratic process, and the most efficient solution
to a problem is not necessarily the most equitable.
Application of the net benefits argument to real world problems,
by means of benefit-cost analysis or a net benefits maximization
model encounters significant problems of evaluation. Estimation of
the investment costs for alternative systems of sewage disposal is not
a difficult task, whereas estimation of the benefits associated with
each of these systems is. The result has been an underestimation of
the benefits for various levels of water quality and a resultant bias
against increases in water quality.
One problem in assigning a value to water quality benefits for
Carmel and Monterey bays is due to collectiveness. That is, the benefits that would result from improved water quality cannot be withheld in order to force payment of the costs of improvement. The 6
miles of beach that were closed are accessible to the public. Therefore, an individual who wishes to use the water may depend on
others to finance abatement of the pollution, knowing that he (the
nonfinancer) will not be excluded from use of the water. Any
attempt to identify the demand for or simulate the value of the
benefits of water quality is accordingly debased.
Another evaluation problem relates to the concept of irreversibility.' 0 The effects of sewage effluent on the marine life of Carmel
and Monterey bays may be unannullable economically under presently foreseeable conditions of technology. This is particularly true
10. S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation: Economics and Policies 251 (3d ed.

1968).

April 1971]

SEWAGE DISPOSAL INA COASTAL URBAN AREA

with respect to marine and oceanographic research.' ' The environment which makes this research, plus certain aesthetic and recreational benefits, possible is an irreplaceable asset because it is a gift of
nature. An attempt could be made to evaluate these benefits by
measuring consumer's surplus. Yet even if successful, this measure
does not consider the option value and, therefore, underestimates the
benefits. 1 2
Other evaluation problems arise because of intangible benefits or
because benefits and costs are not commensurable. But perhaps even
more important with respect to application than the problems of
evaluation is that marginal analysis is derived under the assumption
of continuous as opposed to discrete alternatives. In practical problems of decision making, however, alternatives usually come in
groups which are neither divisible nor aggregatable with other groups
of alternatives. There may not be a unique optimum level of investment in treatment facilities or the optimum may not be feasible
because it entails an impossible division or aggregation of bundles of
alternatives. Instead, there might be several optima or suboptima. In
situations such as these, a new decision rule would have to be devised
since the rule of marginal analysis is no longer adequate.
V
A POLITICAL PROCEDURE
A political procedure offers an interesting alternative to the rule of
marginal analysis for selecting the level of investment in treatment
facilities. This procedure entails designing a series of alternative
solutions (such as increased chlorination, longer outfalls, tertiary
treatment with re-use, etc.) and establishing the costs and effects
associated with each. That is, there would be various objectives determined as being relevant to the residents of the Monterey Peninsula.
Some examples for these would be minimizing the cost of sewage
treatment, cleaning up the beaches for water contact sports, preserving the marine environment exactly as it is, and so forth. Each
alternative solution would be presented as to its cost and the
objectives it satisfied. Then an election could be held to let the voters
decide which of the alternatives they wished to see instituted.
11. Four institutions conduct research in the area: Hopkins Marine Station (Stanford
University); Moss Landing Marine Station (California State Colleges); Naval Post Graduate
School (Monterey); and University of California (Santa Cruz). In addition, the Council of
Monterey Bay, Inc. (COMB) is working toward the establishment of a marine science
graduate-level university on the Peninsula offering advanced degrees in oceanography and
marine sciences, and is stepping up its search for ocean-oriented research industries.
12. Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual Consumption Goods, 78

Q.J. of Econ. 471 (1964).
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The political decision process in a democratic country is appropriate for choices involving trade-offs between efficiency and
equity. In some instances economists and other social scientists can
identify these trade-offs, but they can never decide the issue: the
decision must be collective as distinct from individual.
Similarly, the political procedure is appropriate for solving evaluation problems. The casting and tabulation of votes corresponds to
the assignment of values. Yet this procedure in no way implies that
efforts to evaluate or improve evaluation of certain benefits should
be dismissed. On the contrary, acceptable evaluation techniques
would increase the supply of pertinent voter information. Furthermore, measurement in terms of physical units, such as miles of
recreational beach and numbers of wildlife, can be easily incorporated into the voting procedure whereas the problem of
commensurability restricts the use of this information in marginal
analysis.
More specifically, the political procedure outlined is particularly,
but not exclusively, well suited for collective goods such as water
quality. 1 3 Assume the voters are fully aware that if they reject a
proposal to provide, or increase the amount of, a collective good (by
assessing each person a certain amount) it will not be financed in
another manner. Then the decision of the voters seems appropriate
and just in a democratic society.
A final advantage is that the political decision process provides a
rule of choice in situations where several optima or suboptima
exist." For this and the above reasons the procedure outlined seems
superior to having the choice made by an individual or small group
representing commercial, governmental or industrial interests,
especially in the absence of a "benevolent dictator."
VI
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Following interviews with various officials and technical personnel
working with or consulting for the cities and sanitation districts of
Monterey Peninsula, 41 alternative systems of sewage disposal were
developed and analyzed in terms of their costs and the objectives
which they satisfied. These systems ranged from increased chlorination at individual plants to tertiary treatment plants which would
13. The political decision process, for instance, may also be very appropriate in determining the production and distribution of such private goods as food and clothing when
situations of extreme poverty exist.
14. The use of the terms "optima" and "suboptima" in this study is meaningful only in
the sense that a good (desirable) decision is one for which the course of action taken
improves social welfare more than any other feasible course of action would have.
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serve all communities and produce potable water. The major results
from analyzing these systems-will now be covered.
Increased chlorination, at an annual cost of $3.45 per capita, had
the lowest investment cost. I' Furthermore, after chlorination had
been increased sufficiently and assurance had been given that
chlorination levels would be maintained and planning for higher
levels of treatment would commence, the Monterey County Health
Department reopened the 6 miles of beach. Nevertheless, the Monterey County Health Department and CCRWQCB viewed increased
chlorination as a temporary solution. They felt that coliform
standards were a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of water
quality, and, in conjunction, that the effect of sewage effluent was
damaging to the marine environment of Carmel and Monterey bays.
As described above, the CCRWQCB came out in favor of a regional
solution, but the communities opposed the suggestion. One of the
communities claimed that the cost of their joining a regional system
would be prohibitive due to a required 600 foot sewage lift. That is,
in a more formal sense they were arguing that the marginal savings
(the savings per capita from the addition of this community to the
regional system) due to economies of scale in sewage treatment
plants would be more than offset by the marginal costs of transmitting the sewage from this community to a centralized treatment
facility. The study demonstrated that this argument was substantiated in only one of the fourteen regional systems for which it
was examined.
Another counter to the regional system which was made by a few
of the communities was that they had already invested substantial
sums in present facilities, and, therefore, it was not wise to abandon
these. However, this argument is valid only if additional investment
can accomplish the same objectives at a lower cost with individual
sewage disposal systems than with a regional system. A comparison
between planned individual systems of secondary treatment and a
consolidated secondary treatment system demonstrated that there
would be a savings of approximately two dollars per capita annually
with the regional system.
The alternative of moving to secondary treatment at separate
plants would cost the residents of the Monterey Peninsula $9.51 per
capita annually. This alternative would mean the continuance of dis15. Cost data, estimating curves and mathematical models for planning municipal water
supply/wastewater disposal systems were obtained from consultants, the California Department of Public Health, and published works. Total annual per capita investment cost equals
annual per capita capital cost (based on a 25 year financing period and a 6 percent rate of
interest) plus annual per capita operation and maintenance costs.
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charges into Carmel and Monterey bays. Building individual outfalls
which would satisfy oceanographic data in terms of keeping sewage
effluent out of the nearshore areas would require an additional investment of about $16.00 per capita annually.
One alternative that would keep all sewage effluent out of Carmel
and Monterey bays is a 2'/2 mile consolidated outfall off the tip of
the Peninsula. Although further oceanographic study would be necessary, past studies of currents for the area show that such a length
would be sufficient for mixing and conveying away the effluents
from all communities. A similar solution has been reasonably successful in the San Diego Bay area.
The annual cost of the outfall including operation and maintenance of present treatment facilities would be $7.29 per capita.
Since the volume of sewage is only about one-fifth that discharged
from the San Diego Bay area, the effect of the effluent in the area of
discharge and on the ocean as a whole is expected to be negligible.
From a state, national and even global point of view, however, this
solution would be of doubtful validity. That is, if all coastal communities in California turned to this alternative, then the load on the
assimilative capacities of the ocean would be substantial and perhaps
damaging. This problem corresponds to the case of the infra-marginal
externality.' 6
From a regional point of view the consolidated outfall solution
ignores the possible demand for reclaimed water by the Monterey
Peninsula and surrounding areas. For water which has received
secondary treatment there are two possibilities. One of these is a
ground water recharge system which includes all Monterey Peninsula
communities. Recharge would be carried out by spreading sewage
effluent in a series of natural depressions located 6 miles inland.
Another possibility is an irrigation system which would provide
water to an area of sea water intrusion in a productive agricultural
valley.' ' The annual cost of these systems is $12.75 and $13.93 per
capita respectively. The cost of the latter would be reduced approximately 10 percent if a price equivalent to the present cost of
water in the intrusion area was charged for reclaimed water. In addition, the recharge and irrigation systems entail no disposal of sewage
effluent into the ocean waters.
A final alternative to be considered in this paper is a consolidated
tertiary treatment plant which would produce potable water and be
located over three miles inland so as to allow gravity distribution of
16. Buchanan and Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371 (1962).
17. Moore and Snyder, Some Legal and Economic Implications of Sea Water Intrusion-A Case Study of Ground Water Management, 9 Natural Resources J. 401 (1969).
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water and facilitate handling of sludge and other water reclamation
by-products. The annual per capita cost of this alternative would be
$23.30. Water distributed from the system would cost $344.00 per
acre foot as compared to the present price of $190.00 per acre foot
for water delivered to peninsula homes. Nevertheless, only $196.00
out of the $344.00 are applicable to water supply costs. The
remainder are the necessary costs of wastewater collection and treatment for peninsula communities.
The peninsula is presently searching for alternative sources of
water. The plan now being considered is an $8,500,000 dam project
that has flood control benefits and would provide additional water at
a cost of approximately $200.00 per acre foot.1 However, the
project would inundate the land of 150 to 200 persons.1 9 Furthermore, the project would only satisfy Monterey Peninsula water needs
until 1985, and rising opposition to public water projects emphasizes
the importance of this time factor.
In terms of financing, a range of charges from 15 to 100 percent
of the water bill per connection/per month or flat rate charges ranging from $1.00 to $8.00 per household or establishment per month
would correspond to the range of costs for the alternatives
analyzed.' 0 The charges would, under the present structure, be
reduced by the amount of state and federal grants. They would be
presented to the voters along with relevant information concerning
the effects of and objectives satisfied for each of the alternative
solutions.
VII
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Wantrup has differentiated three levels in a hierarchy of decision
making.2 1 The first and lowest of these deals directly with the control of inputs and outputs: or, in the context of this case study, with
the direct control of investment levels for treatment facilities and
water quality levels, respectively. The individual decision maker and
quantitative precision and optimizing for marginal analysis are
appropriate considerations on this level, as is the above analysis of
alternative solutions for sewage disposal.
The second level controls the institutional framework of the decision-making process on the first level. The importance of this second
level is derived from the fact that institutions are treated as con18. Monterey Peninsula Herald, Jan. 14, 1970, at 1.
19. Monterey Peninsula Herald, Jan. 17, 1970, at 4.
20. The average monthly California sewer service charge is $2.75 per household, accompanied by a property tax assessment of $0.50 per $100.00 assessed valuation.
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straints on the first level, whereas they are treated as independent or
dependent variables on the second level. Davis and Whinston have
demonstrated that the level of social welfare will be greater than or
equal to the previous level if the number of behavioral constraints is
reduced, assuming that the models they employ are applicable in a
real world context. 2 2 Hence, it is conceptually possible that treating
institutions as constraints results in foregoing alternatives for increasing the level of social welfare.
The voting procedure presented earlier, if initiated, would be a
change of the institutional structure by which knowledge at the first
level of decision making is brought into play. It is, therefore, a
change on the second level. This procedure was introduced as a
means of facilitating decision making in the face of problems arising
out of evaluation and the issues of marginal analysis versus discrete
alternatives and individual versus collective decision makers. There
are, however, aspects of these problems and other problems which
this procedure will not alleviate. These are the primary subject of the
remainder of this section.
At the regional level there is, as described previously, an institutional problem associated with the fragmented governmental units of
the Monterey Peninsula. The disposal of sewage by these units
corresponds to the case of nonseparable reciprocal externalities, and
it has been argued that there may not be a Pareto optimal solution in
such a case. 2 This, however, is true only if institutions are treated as
constraints.
One possible modification of the institutional framework as an
attack on this problem is the establishment of a regional sanitation
district or limited function regional government. Besides internalizing
the externalities, 2 the regional body would provide the necessary
organizational structure for implementing a regional solution to the
sewage disposal problem. The desirability of a regional solution is
evidenced by the immediately preceding section and the fact that
centralized collection and treatment facilitates the monitoring of discharges.
21. S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Water Policy and Economic Optimizing: Some Conceptual
Problems in Water Research, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 179 (1967).
22. Davis and Whinston, Welfare Economics and the Theory of Second Best, 32 Rev. of

Econ. Studies 1 (1965).
23. Davis and Whinston, Externalities, Welfare and the Theory of Games, 70 J. Pol.
Econ. 241 (1962).
24. The operation of this regional body according to the rule of marginal analysis would
correspond to decision making on the first level of the hierarchy, as would its analysis of
alternative solutions. The policy matters of establishing a regional body and initiating the
voting procedure under its guidance would correspond to decision making on the second
level.
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In spite of the advantages of a regional body, the logic of the
situation implies that the problem of nonseparable reciprocal externalities could arise between regions just as it has between Monterey
Peninsula communities. On the other hand, it is likely that the ocean
currents along the coast line would lead to one region polluting
another's waters but not vice versa: i.e., a non-reciprocal externality.
Whatever the state of affairs, one solution to the problem is to
monitor pollution at the source, the individual outfall, instead of
monitoring the polluted waters. Then, standards can be enforced and
charges assessed at the individual outfalls. 2 s The operators of the
outfalls are free to respond in the manner they deem appropriate.
They may stop discharging, provide a higher level of treatment, face
legal action, pay the charges, etc. The decisions with respect to the
efficient mode of operation, which are on the first level of the hierarchy, are left to the owner of the outfall.
At the state and national levels things become infinitely more
complicated. Benefits and costs whose incidence is not taken into
account by the region must be evaluated; aggregation of inframarginal externalities is of concern; and future generations must be
more explicitly considered. If the benefits of marine research and
recreation which are not received by present generations or are external to the Monterey Peninsula are to be sustained, then appropriate transfers must be made for the support of treatment
facilities. 2 6 But present generations may not be willing to support
such transfers either at the voting booth or through their representatives.
Even though present generations refuse to support alternatives
which would, for instance, exclude discharge of sewage effluent into
Carmel and Monterey bays, there may be a strong case for prohibiting such discharges. This case is based on two arguments. One is that
we should despoil the best areas last. 2 7 The Monterey Peninsula has
three marine reserves and is the seventh most popular overnight-trip
recreational attraction for California residents and the sixth most
popular recreational attraction for out-of-state auto visitors.' 8 Every
variety of marine recreation is available: abalone hunting, diving,
sea-lion watching and underwater parks to name a few.
25. See, e.g., A. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management (1964).
26. In order to avoid subsidizing pollution, particularly in heavily industrialized areas, it
is preferable to have general income transfers instead of grants earmarked for treatment
facilities.
27. See, e.g., Atkisson and Robinson, Amenity Resources for Urban Living, The Quality
of the Urban Environment (H. S. Perloff ed. 1969).
28. See California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources and the Interagency Council on Ocean Resources, supra note 2.
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The second argument is for the adoption of minimum
standards. 2 9 It is derived out of a concern for future generations and
a recognition of the importance of the concepts of uncertainty, irreversibility and opportunity costs. In applying this argument to the
case of water pollution of Carmel and Monterey bays,, one needs to
compare the costs of preventing the damage (the minimum costs of
the safe standard of conservation) with the maximum possible losses
which might occur if this cost were not expended.
Keeping in mind the reservations expressed previously, the consolidated outfall could, at $1,145,000 per year, represent the minimum costs of the safe standard of conservation. It is, of course,
difficult to estimate the maximum possible losses. Expenditures for
research projects in Carmel and Monterey bays which are carried out
by the 4 institutions noted above will be approximately $700,000
for fiscal year 197 1" But expenditures are worthless as an estimate
of net benefits. Expenditures of $1,000,000 which yield benefits of
$1,000,001 may be economically justified; but elimination of this
activity eliminates both costs and benefits, for a net loss of one
dollar.
Expenditures also convey little if anything about the value of
possible discoveries. Scientific research in the marine and oceanographic fields may eventually contribute to solving the world's food
problem, provide new life-sustaining drugs, and provide replacements
for depleted land-based resources. With respect to recreation, about
900,000 California residents and 1,000,000 out-of-state persons
visited Carmel and Monterey bays between September, 1969 and
August, 1970.'
It is difficult to assign a value to the recreational
experiences gained. It is even more difficult to estimate the total loss
in recreation if the evidence of pollution remains and is, therefore,
publicized as it was last fall and this summer in documentary films
and newsreels over national television.
The case for the discontinuance of discharges is strengthened by
the fact that the opportunity costs associated with it are small relative to those for such an undertaking in San Francisco Bay, for
example. In addition, it is at best difficult to determine the cumulative effects of effluent discharges on a unique marine environment.
Hence, there may be a case for maintaining different standards for
the waters of Carmel and Monterey bays than for the waters of other
29. See S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, supra note 10, at ch. 18.
30. In addition, approximately $800,000 is expended for marine and oceanographic
educational programs. Information was provided by COMB and directors of Peninsula
marine research and educational institutions.
31. See California Advisory Commission on Marine and Coastal Resources and the Interagency Council on Ocean Resources, supra note 2.
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coastal are-as. This idea, which is analogous to the concept of stream
specialization, must, however, be applied to ocean waters with
caution due to the complex phenomenon of ocean currents and
mixing.
It appears to be an appropriate time to return to the questions at
the end of Section III. The discussions of this and previous sections
yield implications which are apropos of some answers.
Following the closing of the beaches, the initiative to solve the
problem might better have come from AMBAG rather than the state.
AMBAG is partly comprised of representatives from Monterey
County and the Monterey Peninsula communities, and, in fact, the
acceptance of regional government is highly dependent on such
representation. The representation affords a liaison between the
region and the communities which is difficult for the state to establish. The communities will, therefore, be more involved in and
responsive to the suggestions of a regional body than to those of the
state. If the state desired to initiate a solution of a problem related to
communities of different regions, it could address the regional bodies
and then serve as arbitrator.
The identification of pollution which led to the beach closures
might have been handled better if it had been under the direct supervision of the Monterey County Health Department and AMBAG, yet
employing state and federal facilities and personnel. The major role
played by the state in the collection of knowledge appeared to
create ill will for at least one community.3 2 The task of accumulating knowledge for alternative solutions is presently being assumed
by AMBAG. This seems proper since the individual communities will
be required to provide a great deal of data input and because
AMBAG offers a forum for discussion of solution ideas and
problems. If there were a problem between regions, then the state
would necessarily contribute to identifying the problem and would
again act as arbitrator in the choice of a solution.
The legal authority to stop water pollution, having been vested in
the state, is apparently properly placed. The closer involvement of a
regional body and the communities within its jurisdiction undoubtedly affected AMBAG's decision to withdraw its building
moratorium before the beaches were open. Similarly, it would have
been awkward for AMBAG to file suits against the Monterey Peninsula communities which partly comprise it.
The communities of the Monterey Peninsula are presently planning to expand individual treatment facilities. If it is granted that the
evidence of the immediately preceding section is sufficient to in32. Monterey Peninsula Herald, Apr. 4, 1970, at 1.
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dicate that this is a "bad" decision, then can it be concluded that the
state's authority was not sufficient? Not necessarily. The decision
may have been a consequence of the lack of knowledge about alternative solutions, or insufficient planning authority for AMBAG, or
apparent inconsistency, as outlined above (Section III), between
local, regional and state actions.
In general, for reasons discussed in this and previous sections, it is
ostensibly correct that the state should be granted ultimate authority in the management of water resources along the coast, but that
the local and regional interests must be deeply involved in the formulation and implementation of plans. Specifically, the tasks of ranking
coastal water areas in order of priority and then establishing and
enforcing minimum standards in accordance with this ranking cannot
be handled effectively without guidance from the state and, for that
matter, the national levels. The establishment of a "coastal authority" for this purpose is an integral part of any effort at water quality
management in the coastal zone since it would avoid the possibility
of universal mediocrity for California's coastal waters. The establishment of this authority would change the institutional framework
within which decisions on the direct control of water quality inputs
and outputs are made. For example, if this authority establishes a
higher standard for water quality in Carmel and Monterey bays, then
the "price of pollution" increases and the number of voter alternafives decreases accordingly for the Monterey Peninsula.
VIII
CONCLUSIONS
In this article it is maintained that water quality decisions cannot
be made by calculation, since the information is lacking, and since
the decisions always include judgmental problems (Section IV), and
hence a political procedure is suggested to make the decisions
(Section V). The alternative is to let some obscure individual or
group make the implicit decision, and disguise it as a purely scientific
matter.
It is further argued that even such a political procedure is not
entirely adequate. As part of this argument, the article includes an
evaluation of the actions of the State of California under The PorterCologne Water Quality Control Act.' I The results of this evaluation
can be summarized as follows:
a) The state was apparently quite serious about wanting a
regional sewage disposal system for the Monterey Peninsula (Section
33. Cal. Water Code Ann. § § 13311, 13350 (West 1970).
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II). In comparison to having several local systems, it appears that
such a system would be cheaper, and, perhaps more important, it
would have offered some significant water supply alternatives that
would otherwise be foregone (Section VI). Although the state's
actions may have unintentionally foregone a regional solution
(Section III), The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act has
been in existence only a year,' and so such setbacks may be a result of
inexperience rather than any inherent weakness in the Act.
b) Two changes with respect to the powers and duties of the state
under The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act are suggested
(Section VII). First, from an operational standpoint pollution
should be monitored at the source, the individual outfall, instead of
monitoring the polluted waters. Second, the Act should be extended
to explicitly encompass the tasks of ranking coastal water areas and
establishing standards in accordance with this ranking.

